Sport mega-events, the non-West and the ethics of event hosting by Dowse, S & Fletcher, TE
1 
 
Sport mega-events, the non-West and the ethics of event hosting  
 
Events and sports events are perceived as having the potential to contribute to a 
number of benefits for the host country and its communities. However, mega 
sports events in particular are also known for their darker side. These 
consequences flow from the scale and complexity of the event, and the logistics 
of delivering what is effectively a national mega-project. The socio-political and 
economic environment of the host is an important consideration for both 
prospective hosts and event owners when allocating hosting rights. It is 
therefore, unsurprising that concerns have been raised over the relatively recent 
relocation of events to developing countries which, by their nature, frequently 
lack the economic, political and social stability of the traditional industrialised 
host. Developing nations are less affluent and arguably less prepared to deliver 
large scale sports events than developed nations. Within developing contexts the 
cost of hosting and risk of failure is likely to be far higher than for events held in 
the developed world. Therefore, this paper asks, ‘are governing bodies, when 
equipped with this knowledge, ethically obliged to withhold hosting rights from 
developing countries?’ This paper argues that denying sovereign States the 
right to make their own decisions would appear to compound the low status of 
countries that mega-event hosting is perceived to address. It would also reinforce 
the positioning of countries as subordinate and subject to a form of neo-colonial 
control. Indeed, despite laudable claims, the primary interest of the event 
owners is the delivery of an event, meaning that considerations of individual 
national contexts are largely irrelevant to any award. The paper contends that 
event hosts – particularly those in the developing world - are potentially 
vulnerable to exploitation by the event owner. 
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Introduction 
Events and sports events are perceived as having the potential to contribute to a number of 
benefits for the host country and its communities. Amongst other things these include: 
bringing lasting social and economic benefits, enhancing national identity and image, 
regeneration and place (re)development, as well as facilitating community cohesion and well-
being (Sharpley and Stone, 2011). However, mega sports events (MSE) in particular are also 
known for their darker side. For example, they are frequently associated with corruption, 
soaring economic costs, environmental degradation, securitisation, gentrification, violence 
and human rights violations (Author B). More routinely, principally via media coverage, sports 
events remain a primary agonist in the (re)articulation of structural inequalities, along the 
lines of gender, sexuality, ‘race’ and ethnicity, social class, disability, and their intersections 
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(Author B). Thus, according to Hayes and Karamichas (2012: 2) MSEs are not simply sporting 
or cultural phenomena: 
They are also political and economic events, characterized by the generation and 
projection of symbolic meanings – most obviously over the nature of statehood, 
economic power and collective cultural identity – and by social conflict, especially 
over land use, and over the extent and contours of public spending 
commitments. 
Without a doubt, MSEs have significant consequences for the host community. These 
consequences flow from the scale and complexity of the event, and the logistics of delivering 
what is effectively a national mega-project. They also result from the accompanying media 
attention that temporarily places the host in the global spotlight. MSE hosting opportunities 
are invariably presented as a means of attaining a range of social, political and economic 
benefits, particularly for the host communities, who customarily are the most directly 
impacted by delivery of such projects (Author A; Lindsay, 2014). While the socio-economic 
and political utility of these events has been appreciated for some time, the associated 
delivery processes also have an established history of raising social justice concerns (Adams 
and Piekarz, 2015; Butler and Aicher, 2015; Finkel, 2015; Brackenridge et al., 2013; Amnesty 
International, 2013; COHRE, 2007).1 
The lack of effective processes to deal with concerns generated by MSE hosting processes is 
also evident in contemporary calls by social justice groups, like the Sports and Rights Alliance, 
for MSE owners to establish a human and social rights framework to protect and promote the 
interests of those impacted by event delivery processes. 2  Some positive progress has 
occurred, for example, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has recently incorporated 
human rights principles in its Host City Contract, while The Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) has recognised the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights.3 However, meaningful outcomes are yet to be identified and the sincerity 
of event owners to see past their own, predominantly financial, interests remains in doubt.  
In part, this slow response could be attributed to the weaknesses in the current knowledge 
base informing public policy about the actual outcomes of these events, and what an 
adequate and effective response might entail. This gap is likely to be linked to the historical 
dominance of the economic justification for hosting which was frequently based on pre-event 
predictions, rarely followed up by post event evaluations (Coalter, 2012). Consequently, there 
is a great deal of information available on the economic potential of MSEs; much of which 
actually contests the positive claims made (Fedderson et al, 2009; de Nooij, et al, 2009). This 
is not to suggest that there is no support for the possibility of economic benefit (Gratton et al, 
2001), but the overall message is that realising it is extremely challenging and will be especially 
difficult for some hosts. These challenges arise from the contextual sensitivity of event 
impacts and outcomes, which means that the socio-political and economic environment of 
the host is an important consideration when seeking to determine what these might be.  
It is therefore, unsurprising that concerns have been raised over the relatively recent 
relocation of events to developing countries which, by their nature, frequently lack the 
economic, political and social stability of the traditional industrialised host (Matheson and 
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Baade, 2004). This contextual difference is important as the absence of this stability, along 
with invariably lower levels of the organisational and physical infrastructure required for 
delivery, complicates the achievement of positive outcomes because it makes hosting far 
more expensive and resource intensive. The expected return on investment for these hosts is 
also questioned, particularly with respect to the associated infrastructure development and 
its longer-term social value. The recent media images of derelict Olympic stadia in Brazil are a 
case in point (The Guardian, 2017).  
The prevalence of negative social outcomes for MSE projects has inevitably drawn attention 
to the ethical responsibilities of events owners who award their events on the basis of a 
competitive bidding process. This paper is concerned with exploring debates around whether 
it is ethically responsible for developing countries to be awarded hosting rights for MSEs when 
event owners know that, in these countries, community rights and interests are unlikely to 
have a well-functioning protective framework, public resources are insufficient for existing 
social priorities and, consequently, vulnerable communities are likely to be placed 
unnecessarily at risk. Conversely, why these areas seek to host in the first place, especially 
given the more limited potential for positive social and economic outcomes to be achieved, 
also needs extrapolating. Both of these questions need to be addressed in order to return to 
the ethical dilemma of whether, for example, developing countries ought to be protected 
from themselves by event owners through the act of withholding hosting rights. Because, 
perhaps, if the aims of these hosts can be understood and the reasons why they may or may 
not be delivered on are recognised, it will be possible to consider whether an ethically driven 
prohibition on hosting in developing country contexts is fair and justifiable or, whether an 
appropriate answer for ethical considerations might lay elsewhere.  
 
Sport events, Westernisation and the non-West 
Events are embedded within the socio-cultural milieus of their host communities. Many of the 
world’s international sporting events, staged since the Second World War, have 
predominantly emerged and been hosted within Europe, North America, Japan and Australia. 
This is, in part, due to the success and growth within these post war nations’ economies. These 
regions of the world, collectively known as the ‘developed’ or ‘Western’ world, have 
developed a series of value systems over what sport is, how and where it should be played 
and, more importantly to this paper, how and where their associated events ought to be 
hosted.  
International sports governing bodies for the majority of ‘major’ sports, such as association 
football, cricket, rugby and tennis, were founded in Western nations and so were also loosely 
based around Western values. This provided the basis for the structural dominance evident 
today, as Gupta (2009: 1779) argues “Because Western nations were the founder members 
of most international sporting associations they dominated these bodies and set the rules for 
a sport, dominated its finances, and determined the location of major international events”. 
This dominance notwithstanding, there is a clear trend towards many ‘emerging’ regions 
outside of the Western world hosting, and/or actively seeking to host, international sporting 
events (Author B). A result of which, as Little (1995) wrote, mega-events, 
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Have brought the issues of world justice to the fore of an international political 
arena long dominated by the self-serving discourse of the world’s major 
industrial powers. (Little, 1995: 265) 
MSEs have been staged in non-Western countries for some time. For example: Tokyo 
Olympics, 1964; Mexico Olympics, 1968; Seoul Olympics, 1988; FIFA World Cup in Uruguay 
1930, Brazil, 1950, Mexico 1986, Japan/South Korea, 2002, India, 2010, South Africa, 2010 and 
Brazil, 2014 and 2016. However, for many, the 2008 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games 
set in motion a new social and political agenda for considering the role of non-Western nations 
on the major international sports events circuit (Palmer, 2013). Russell and O’Connor (2013) 
suggest that the ‘success’ of Beijing has encouraged other non-Western nations/cities to 
announce to the IOC their credentials, willingness and readiness to ‘bid’ to be host cities for 
future Olympics. However, the current trend may reflect the development of events as a 
benchmark of development status because to host is considered ‘normal practice’ for States 
at a certain level of development. However, it appears possible that the current volume of 
events held annually means that they no longer easily perform the historical role as marker of 
distinction in the global marketplace of cities as perhaps they once did.  
Indeed, emerging nations from Asia, South America and the Middle East are now actively 
seeking, and are being courted by event owners and organisers, to be potential future hosts 
and venues for all types of international sporting events; many of which attract global media 
audiences (Author B).  Countries such as China (Beijing Olympics and Paralympics, 2008; India 
(Commonwealth Games 2010), Bahrain (Formula One - annual), Russia (UEFA Champions 
League Final, 2010) and Brazil (men’s FIFA World Cup, 2014 and Olympic and Paralympic 
Games, 2016) have all recently staged major sporting events.  
This global shift in the hosting of international sporting events outside of the West is set to 
continue. For example, the men’s FIFA Football World Cup will be hosted by Russia in 2018 
and Qatar in 2022 respectively. Bang (2011: 1) suggests that “the biggest events are leaving 
Europe and North America”. Evidence of this shift can be provided by the Danish Institute for 
Sports Studies Research which predicts that only 23% of major international events, such as 
the Olympic and Paralympic Games and world championship tournaments in football, 
athletics and swimming, will be held within Western countries after 2010. The remaining 77% 
of these events will be held within countries from the Middle East, Asia, Africa (south of the 
Sahara Desert) and Central/South America (Bang, 2011).   
This shifting pattern can be conceptualised through the idea of ‘post-Westernisation’ 
(Rumford, 2007). For Rumford this shift is not simply about the decreasing salience of the idea 
of the West as a reference point for political identification and global leadership, rather, it can 
be characterised through a series of processes. Firstly, he suggests that post-Westernisation 
signals the increasing “lack of unity within those countries formerly considered to have a 
common ‘Western’ world view” (p.205). Secondly, post-Westernisation signifies the co-
existence of multiple ‘modernities’ – Western, post-communist, Islamic – as opposed to an 
assumed dominance of the West over the rest. Finally, post-Westernisation involves 
recognition of a ‘new East’ capable of “shaping global affairs previously seen as the preserve 
of the West” (p.206). 
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Viewed through the lens of the relocation of MSE, the reality of post-Westernisation appears 
further away than it may actually seem because this development presents international 
sports organisations and their commercial sponsors with opportunities to make significant 
economic gains by, for example, accessing new markets, while the associated costs are borne 
by a host ill-equipped to bear them. The greatest irony to this relationship is that awarding 
the event to those developing contexts can be perceived as justice for the historically 
marginalised when it could equally be presented as an opaque tool of exploitation, which 
offers up scarce resources, and may additionally complicate social and economic development 
in these areas.  
Ultimately, debate continues as to what benefit(s) the staging or hosting of a MSE can actually 
bring to a country or a city, especially one in the developing world. While it is frequently 
suggested that hosting opportunities will facilitate much needed social development within 
the host city/country, the counter position is that their utility is rather to project symbolically 
a message of parity to the international community. For example, Darnell (2012: 105) argues 
that, “sports mega-events … are used to showcase successful development, particularly for 
States struggling for legitimacy within competitive globalisation”.  
Whilst mega-events clearly present opportunities for development, crucially, the ways in 
which rights to host are contested, how they are allocated and subsequently, how they are 
expected to be delivered, are judged according to Western standards. For Hayes and 
Karamichas (2012: 6), such Western-centrism raises the question of homogenisation and 
cultural standardisation, or “rather the projection of a Western, liberal model of social 
relations on local host communities”. This begs the question of whether we are in fact 
witnessing a shifting locus of power after all. That MSE are being hosted in developing 
countries with greater frequency is indisputable, however it remains the case that MSE are 
surrounded by Western logics over their production and delivery which, in many ways, 
reaffirms, rather than challenges, Western hegemony. 
 
Ethical concerns for the impacts of hosting 
The general destablisation of the economic case for hosting MSEs has prompted greater 
attention on the non-economic opportunities presented by event initiatives, regardless of 
who the aspirant host is (Chalip, 2006; Maennig & Porche, 2008).  Within or alongside this 
there has also been a noticeable rise in the attention given to the social cost of delivering an 
event which hitherto received relatively little attention. For example, research commissioned 
to inform a joint Dutch – Belgium bid for the 2018 and 2022 men’s FIFA Football World Cups 
drew attention to the absence of a comprehensive and evidence-based approach to 
evaluating the implications of hosting, particularly with respect to social costs (de Nooij et al., 
2010). This gap suggests that there are a number of governments that have pursued such 
‘opportunities’ without the knowledge required to understand how the event will impact their 
communities. 
Developments in media technology mean that it is now difficult to ignore or conceal the social 
impacts of hosting projects. In recent years there have been numerous reports and media 
footage of harm linked to event delivery processes and associated protest (Broudehoux, 2012; 
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Lamond and Spracklen, 2014). It is also possible that the enhanced profile of these issues is a 
feature of the relocation of mega-events to developing countries. Here, the capacity to absorb 
the effects of event delivery emerge into sharper focus because, for example, the 
infrastructure development often perceived as causing the diversion of scarce public funding 
away from social priorities is likely to have more limited social value and the effects of such 
diversion more obvious. In such circumstances the MSE becomes the focus for displays of 
public protest as was witnessed in Brazil in the preparation periods leading to the 2014 men’s 
FIFA Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Butler and Aicher, 
2015).  
Growing alongside (and possibly as a consequence of) the increased profile of the negative 
impacts of event hosting is a growing demand for public influence in the decision to pursue 
an award. This is evident in the use of referendums to determine whether bid ambitions carry 
popular support and the results of referendums held in Krakow (2014), Boston (2015) and 
Hamburg (2015) confirm that this is not guaranteed. However, while civic engagement in the 
decision-making process is encouraging, it is not clear that the ability to influence relevant 
decision-making processes extends into the event preparation period if the event is awarded.  
What is clear is that momentum is growing for both event owners and governments to be 
made accountable for the impacts of hosting and also for the degree to which outcomes 
match the promises made (Author A; Cornelissen, 2012).  
Given the high profile problems associated with MSEs, is it fair to suggest that aspirant hosts 
are aware that these initiatives carry a range of risks. What is less clear is how far those in the 
related political and policy making circles are aware of the true nature of the event potential 
in terms of the goals that are realisable and how they might be realised. It is important 
therefore, that any decision towards hosting is well informed. Research into the 2010 men’s 
FIFA Football World Cup suggests that knowledge concerning very fundamental issues, such 
as how delivering the event in line with the event owner’s wishes and the terms and 
conditions agreed through the contractual process, would constrain activity to achieve local 
policy goals varied tremendously across many relevant decision-making networks (Author A). 
It was equally true that very specific political and international relations goals existed and it 
appeared likely that even if at national level there was complete knowledge of these 
constraints, these drivers would have outweighed such considerations. While as a case study 
it would be inappropriate to generalise the findings of the South African experience to all 
developing contexts, key aspects of these findings are offered for consideration.  
 
Understanding the political support for the 2010 men’s FIFA Football World Cup hosting 
project 
One of the key features of South Africa’s policy ambitions for the 2010 men’s FIFA Football 
World Cup was the foreign policy goal of improving the country’s status and position with the 
international and regional political elite. An important dimension of this expectation was that 
hosting would improve the ability to pursue and defend national objectives and interests in 
the future. In part, this expectation was grounded in the belief that the event would convey 
the symbolic message that the country and, by association, continent, had achieved globally 
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recognised standards of development and deserved to be taken seriously in/by the 
international community.  
This expectation has to be understood in relation to the positioning of developing countries 
within the international community as subordinate to developed industrialised nations. It also 
has to be understood in relation to South Africa’s unfortunate historical legacy of apartheid 
which has weakened the country’s regional standing and which continues to constrain its 
ability to pursue regional leadership ambitions (Adebajo, Adedeji & Landsberg, 2007). This 
ambition was clearly set out by former President, Thabo Mbeki, in a State of the Nation 
address:  
In the next few months South Africa will launch its bid to host the 2010 Soccer 
World Cup. Government wishes to assure our Soccer World Cup Bid Committee 
of our fullest support. … We are certain of victory this time around, a victory that 
will be for all Africa … as African’s to host the Cricket World Cup, like the 
President’s Golf Cup later this year, communicates the message that we are not 
wrong when we said that this, the 21st century, will be an African Century. (South 
Africa: The Presidency, 2003a) 
The ambition was also re-stated by then Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, at the handover of 
the bid book: 
Africa clearly continues to move away from the fringes, and is asserting her 
rightful place among other regions of the world … in 2010, Africa will take the 
stage and rightly so give the positive developments already in place in the 
continent … It is very important that all should realize that the time has come for 
Africa to play its part. (South Africa: The Presidency, 2003b) 
The underlying message in these statements was that South Africa and Africa, as political 
entities, are set on the outskirts of the international community and do not enjoy a parity of 
recognition as a consequence. They also confirm that the South African government perceived 
the hosting initiative as an opportunity to enhance both status and role as a means of 
developing from its peripheral status on a global stage. This suggests that in order to evaluate 
the ethical considerations of hosting projects, attention should be paid to exploring the basis 
and legitimacy of such beliefs and, moreover, whether hosting projects may be an effective 
means of addressing the challenges observed. To understand this further, we must 
acknowledge the role of the State in event hosting.  
In terms of International Relations theory the State is recognised as the principal actor within 
the international community and conceptually, as an ideal, exists as a political authority 
arranged as a constitutionally independent government over a defined territory and settled 
population (Spears, 2004; Lake, 2008). Only the government holds the legitimate right to use 
force and this right derives from the responsibility held for maintaining internal order and 
protecting from external threat with the purpose of safeguarding society and facilitating social 
development (Jackson, 1990). The State is, therefore, expected to be an effective service and 
security provider that is capable of exercising control over the population and over institutions 
for the distribution of wealth. For this reason, these attributes are linked to perceptions of 
capacity, legitimacy and citizen’s identification (Van de Walle & Scott, 2011). By virtue of 
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constitutional independence, the State is a sovereign entity, which has no internal equal or 
external superior. The government alone holds the authority to define and implement 
domestic laws and policies and those which govern foreign engagement and the limitations 
on the extent of its own authority.  
The historically recognised overarching power configuration within the international 
community is invariably described as being between the developed North and developing 
South, the First and Third World or West and non-West (Gupta, 2009). Understanding where 
a State is located in this classification is important because to be defined as Southern, 
developing, Third World or non-Western, like those States in Latin America or Africa, reflects 
a position of subordination in relation to Northern, developed, First World or Western States 
like the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The basis of this positioning is not 
theoretical. The North/South, First/Third, developed/developing, West/non-West divide is 
grounded in a history of colonial or imperial domination and, more recently, the emergence 
of new States through, for example, the territorial break up of Eastern Europe. The importance 
of this history is that it has enabled ‘developed’ States to establish extensive access to, and 
influence on, the key resource channels in the global economy which underpin and enable 
them to maintain their hegemonic position. In essence, newer States have joined an 
established system with a recognised right to equality, but on the basis of disadvantageous 
power relations, which undermines this equality in practice. For this reason, improving the 
capacity for new and developing States to access and influence the ‘core’ is a frequent foreign 
policy concern because until this happens, and greater parity is recognised, they will remain 
marginalised on the periphery or semi-periphery of international relations (Schwengel, 2008).  
Understanding the different dimensions of sovereignty, international structures of power 
relations, access to resources and perceptions of status, reputation, capacity and legitimacy 
are all important when thinking about the engagement of developing or newly emerged 
powers with MSEs. In addition to the event ‘product’, these events are hugely symbolic 
undertakings which are perceived to convey messages of national identity, legitimacy and 
capability to a domestic and foreign audience. Sports events often act as a focus for nationalist 
sentiments, providing citizens with opportunities to come together in a visible, collective 
expression of ‘who we are’, in opposition to an equally important, but denigrated ‘who we 
are not’ (Whigham, 2013). Such expressions of collective identity and togetherness are 
relatively rare in modern societies, and so sports events can be powerful symbols of 
nationhood and unity in people’s otherwise fragmented lives (Author B). This symbolic value 
can often overshadow their financial implications. With this in mind, the irrationality of 
investment in an event with limited potential for a substantive economic return can be 
considered rather rational, especially in countries with weak or limited international profile 
and influence or with deeply divided societies, or a history of internal division and conflict. 
The variable outcomes of MSEs with respect to economic and social development, image and 
reputation highlights that hosting initiatives are a possible poisoned chalice. Whether a State 
(developing or otherwise) should host a MSE is a legitimate question and the answer to this 
question ought to be made on the basis of an informed understanding of the ways in which 
their individual context will be impacted by the delivery processes associated with the event, 
as well as, the goals sought. For this responsible approach to move forward there has to be 
9 
 
more clarity/honesty from the hosts about the goals themselves, especially because 
promoted, perceived and actual goals are not necessarily the same thing. This is clear in 
research into the economic dimensions of hosting initiatives, which shows that, not only is it 
hard to achieve an economic return on investment, but also that the key policy makers are 
likely to be aware that this is the case (Horne, 2004; de Nooij et al, 2010). This suggests that 
economic concerns have not been the primary motivation for these hosts and that policy 
statements are used primarily to gain the necessary public support to pursue hosting 
opportunities. For these more socio-cultural dimensions, the core question of whether MSEs 
can and do offer States a return on investment, which balances the associated risk and costs, 
remains as salient as it is for the economic dimension. However, evaluating the wisdom of 
policy decisions grounded in these objectives is infinitely harder than evaluating economic 
dimensions. This may be the reason why there are fewer studies in this area and consequently, 
less empirical evidence of the outcomes gained.  
What is known about the potential for image and reputation based dividends is that, like 
economic, the opportunities are primarily grounded in the ability to capture global attention 
and elevate popular interest in the host nation. This potential is identified in the pre-event 
and post-event phases as well as games-time. Through this, MSEs are expected to help States 
develop, or consolidate, a ‘brand’ (Sturm, 2015). The perceived ‘brand’ of a country is 
important, for as previously discussed, the power and status of a State is influenced by how it 
is perceived and understood by others, and this will be informed by the views and stereotypes 
held about it. Mega-events can support positive image and reputation development because 
they offer opportunities to project positive imagery. Moreover, in those instances where a 
State is attempting to overturn negative perceptions, event hosting can help demonstrate 
distance travelled from ‘then’ through to ‘now’. The South Korean government displayed this 
political ambition through the 2002 men’s FIFA Football World Cup which was expected to 
help the country ‘rebrand itself as a leading economy after the Asian economic crisis of the 
late 1990s’ (Horne, 2004: 1244).  
While the successful delivery of a MSE that meets and reflects global standards of 
development certainly ought to enhance the reputation and image of the host, the positive 
potential in this area may be less than anticipated. This disjoint reflects the difficulties 
inherent in changing established perceptions and underpins the need for strategic and long-
term investment in image and reputation development. Consequently, MSEs are only likely to 
be effective as a tool of image and reputation change if they are used as part of a broader 
nation-branding strategy. Indeed, evidence suggests that image and reputation change is 
unlikely to occur if the event is the focus of a temporary marketing campaign (Anholt, 2011). 
In addition, event-led makeovers are also problematic as they risk exposing the host to 
unhelpful media projections that reinforce negative stereotypes or may focus attention on 
political activity and social situations that may compromise positive reputations (Dimeo & Kay, 
2004; Finlay & Xin, 2010; Palmer, 2013). Problems in the event delivery process are also likely 
to receive extensive coverage which may compromise the positive images hosts seek to 
convey. For example, media reports of the 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi which 
documented unsanitary living conditions and infrastructure failures, like the collapse of a 
pedestrian bridge were invariably unaligned to the image the hosts sought to project (Curi et 
al., 2011).  
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Anticipated positive outcomes, with respect to image and reputational change may be difficult 
to achieve because media coverage tends to rely on imagery and narratives that are informed 
by and reinforce existing stereotypes (Darcy, 2003; Dimeo & Kay, 2004). This implies that the 
positive marketing potential of events is likely to be lower for countries that are associated 
with negative stereotypes and, in turn, are also in greatest need of re-imaging support (Ibid). 
In the main, these countries are likely to be the more newly established and which do not 
currently possess the levels of political, social and economic stability of their peers, thus 
identifying them as different and potentially less valuable. As a result, Dimeo and Kay (2004) 
suggest that developing countries and former colonies have less capacity to control media 
discourses, and are additionally challenged by the need to counter the use of colonial terms 
of reference and stereotypes in media reports. Darnell (2014: 1000) supports this position and 
suggests that popular representations of sport and events “can serve to secure the innocence 
and benevolence of global sport for Western audiences while insulating them from, and 
therefore solidifying, the political economy of unequal development.”  
However, any attempts to make sweeping generalisations about the hosting capacity of 
developing nations are not advised because developed nations are by no means insulated 
from negative and potentially damaging media coverage. For example, a comparative analysis 
of the coverage of the 2006 and 2010 men’s FIFA Football World Cups held in Germany and 
South Africa respectively, found that the tone of reporting was remarkably similar, despite the 
fact that Germany is a developed country and not a former colony, while South Africa is a 
developing economy with a history of colonial control (Media Tenor, 2010). Interviews carried 
out with reporters as part of the study into the South African experience explored this feature 
of the findings and feedback received suggested a level of benevolence in reporting of the 
2010 event which may have reflected a general consensus to recognise the additional 
challenges faced by South Africa.4 It was additionally suggested that this benevolent approach 
was not witnessed in the case of Germany and would be unlikely for future developed country 
hosts. However, interpreting this as wholly positive for South Africa as it appears prima facie 
would be ill-advised. Indeed, such an approach from the media arguably does little to 
challenge Orientalist discourses surrounding the backwardness and organisational 
inefficiencies of developing nations and, as such, could have the opposite effect of reinforcing 
neo-colonial rhetoric of Western paternal dominance and superiority. Ultimately, this means 
that while event-hosting may support positive image development as part of a wider 
programme of image improvement there are significant risks involved; risks that political 
stakeholders may neither fully appreciate nor have the capacity to manage.   
Within the domestic polity, events are perceived as capable of supporting the consolidation 
of political legitimacy because locating an event in a country signals that the host has been 
recognised as the legitimate territorially bound political authority (Levermore, 2004).5 This is 
important because external recognition confers legitimacy on claims to statehood and this 
recognition may have internal significance because they provide positive collective ‘moments’ 
that can foster sentiments of unity across divided domestic populations. The 1995 men’s 
Rugby World Cup in South Africa illustrates these possibilities and is well-known for a 
perceived nation-building effect. However, despite receiving plaudits for this nation-building 
impact, how meaningful the effect was is debated and the associated discussions question 
whether the collective euphoria identified should be interpreted as social cohesion or as a 
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temporary display of positive emotions inflated by the media and emotional heat of the event 
(Grundlingh, 1998; Hendricks, 2008).  
Core to the concerns about the nation-building potential of sport events is that the organisers 
are primarily concerned with event delivery and not necessarily the social problems that exist 
internally. Moreover, rather than alleviating these problems, sports events may risk 
exacerbating social divides by emphasising existing inequalities and diverting resources from 
other social priorities (Hylton & Morpeth, 2012; Butler and Aicher, 2015). The pressures 
created by hosting an event like, the fixed deadline for delivery, can result in the suppression 
of civil rights and undermine the perceived legitimacy of the host government. There are 
examples of suppression in established democratic sSates, including Australia and the UK 
(Nauright, 2004; Lindsay, 2014), which makes the trend for events to be hosted more regularly 
in non-established democracies and emerging States like Russia, Qatar and South Africa 
(where civil rights are inconsistently enjoyed or protected) particularly worrying.  
MSEs are globally popular commercial spectacles that offer numerous opportunities to 
advance political ambitions. Although marketed on the basis of their economic potential, 
weaknesses in the economic evidence base suggests that broader socio-political dimensions 
are more influential motivators of political support. Problematically, information regarding 
the actual impact of MSEs in terms of nation-building, and the social outcomes that lie below, 
is sparse. In part, this is because there are few agreed proxies for measuring such impacts and 
those that are recognised tend to be temporary. Moreover, these non-economic drivers are 
obfuscated by the need to justify the public expenditure involved, particularly as positive 
‘intangible’ outcomes are difficult to demonstrate and quantify. This does not mean that they 
are unrealisable. MSEs have a potentially unique capacity to capture global attention and 
elevate popular interest in a country over a sustained period of time. In the context of national 
interests, defined in terms of enhanced foreign and domestic policy capacity, the political 
opportunities hosting presents are extensive and broad-ranging. For these reasons, events are 
attractive policy options for all countries, but potentially more so for the political elite in 
contexts where domestic structures and capacities require development and where 
international influence or commercial engagement is weak. These are certainly characteristics 
of the developing country hosts that are now competing successfully to secure hosting rights.  
This raises the possibility that, rather than the opportunity to gain specific benefits linked to 
the event, the contemporary demand for hosting rights in developing country contexts is a 
consequence of political developments in international relations. These developments include 
a shift in political and economic power away from the global North or ‘West’ and demands for 
greater equality of opportunity and parity of status by emerging economies. Explored through 
this perspective, it is possible that hosting ambitions are located within a broad and over-
arching political ambition to re-define relations in the international community and, in so 
doing, gain access to the political and economic opportunities held by those occupying the 
‘core’ (those traditionally described as the ‘West’) of international relations.  
Event owners are amenable to this development because a shift in location offers a valuable 
opportunity to access new and developing consumer markets on a proportionately low risk 
basis (Author B). Indeed the potential return from an emerging country host could be 
extensive, particularly if organisational inexperience in the management of mega-projects and 
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weaknesses in governmental structures increase vulnerability to exploitation through, for 
example, disadvantageous contracting processes (Author A). However, it could also be argued 
that the relocation of events to developing countries offers opportunities to maintain existing 
power structures of dominance by the core over the periphery by providing access to political 
and economic resources under the guise of ‘justice’ for development.  
 
What then are the ethical questions? 
The formal sovereignty of States within the international community renders a universal 
exclusion of certain polities from the global competition inappropriate. Such prohibition 
would be discriminatory, while at the same time deny these countries the opportunity to 
explore alternative means of addressing domestic and foreign policy concerns – and 
particularly those that reflect the structural disadvantages of the international community. It 
would also reinforce the positioning of countries as subordinate and subject to a form of neo-
colonial control.  
However, this is not to suggest that the processes currently in place for awarding events could 
not be improved or that the policy decisions made by political leaders with respect to MSEs 
are necessarily well-informed. It is reasonably safe to assume that international sport 
governing bodies like FIFA and the IOC welcome the move of events to developing country 
contexts, not only for altruistic ideals of sharing opportunities, but also for the commercial 
opportunities presented in terms of accessing new markets. Research by Author A into the 
South African experience also suggests that this relationship can be tainted by the perception 
that the governing body is exploiting their host’s weaknesses in ways that reflect the 
disadvantages experienced as a result of their subordinate position within the international 
community generally. This exploitative side of the relationship may not be immediately 
apparent. For example, initially, FIFA’s introduction in 2000 of the policy of rotation and the 
award of the event to South Africa was positioned by the government as justice gained for a 
continent historically marginalised by the international community.6 However, as the process 
of delivery unfolded it appeared that, rather than justice, the event became a mechanism for 
paternal exploitation by FIFA. Much of this was linked to the contractual obligations 
associated with the event which were poorly understood initially, and which had debilitating 
implications. It also appeared that political sensitivities to perceptions of incompetence and 
the desire for international approval weakened South Africa’s negotiating position in relation 
to FIFA, with the net effect being a compression of the ability to achieve foreign and domestic 
policy priorities, whether directly associated with the event or not. The case of South Africa is 
but one example that clearly illustrates the complexities involved in hosting MSEs; 
complexities that, evidence suggests, are exacerbated when considered in developing 
contexts. 
How we manage the demands and expectations of governing bodies and event owners with 
the host project is an important area within event studies that has not generally received a 
great deal of attention. If we centralise ethics as an event host consideration, this is a 
significant omission. Indeed, that we know very little about the relationships between hosts 
and key stakeholders raises a number of ethical issues regarding how governments may lose 
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control of the parameters of event delivery in ways that compromise the outcomes sought 
through the hosting initiative. It may also be the case, as we have suggested for the men’s 
FIFA Football World Cup in South Africa, that international sports organisations may gain 
power, albeit temporarily, within a sovereign nation State through the hosting process in ways 
that could be considered comparable to that held by another sovereign State with greater 
power resources. More generally, these considerations bring to light the possibility that States 
new to hosting global mega-events have very limited understanding of what they are getting 
involved in and, as a result, might be seduced by what become unrealisable opportunities, 
much to the detriment of local communities’ everyday lives. Such a situation may derive from 
a governing body’s control of the management processes associated with the event and an 
historical lack of inter-State knowledge exchange. The ability to assert such dominance with 
little resistance from the host might be reflective of a lack of State-confidence to negotiate 
with a body that effectively holds the keys to Pandora’s Box and the opportunities therein.  
 
Conclusion  
Given the significant financial investment required to successfully host a MSE, it is absolutely 
essential that all parties involved in the process sufficiently understand and appreciate the 
opportunities and pitfalls associated. We know that, by their very nature, developing nations 
are less affluent and arguably less prepared to deliver large scale sports events than 
developed nations. Within developing contexts the cost of hosting and risk of failing to achieve 
sought outcomes is likely to be far higher than for events held in the developed world. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to ask, ‘are governing bodies, when equipped with this knowledge, 
ethically obliged to withhold hosting rights from developing countries?’  
Some might argue that this is the responsible thing to do. Palmer (2013) reasserts that a major 
challenge facing organisers in developing contexts is ensuring that they do not fall victim to 
Global North/First World/developed/Western perceptions that they are boxing above their 
weight. In other words, they must ensure they succeed – otherwise they will reinforce the 
perception that they are not developed enough to host an event of such magnitude. The 
failure of one event has a influential demonstration effect for other developing nations. 
Palmer suggests there is an element of ‘I told you so’ amongst developed nations when 
developing nations either struggle or fail. She warns that the obvious solution for avoiding 
such a situation is for developing nations to invest disproportionately in the event. For 
example, the original budget for the 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi was US$1.3 
billion. This was reported to have mushroomed to US$15 billion, which was seven times more 
expensive than Melbourne in 2006, leading Majumdar and Mehta (2010) to describe the event 
as “by far and away the most expensive games in history” (cited in Palmer, 2013: 116). Palmer 
goes on to argue that this is because there is a tendency amongst developing nations to, not 
only aim to equal the achievements of their developed counterparts, they wish to outdo them. 
Given that success is invariably judged in relation to previous hosts’ performances it is likely 
that all hosts seek to outdo their predecessor, whether they are developed or not, but the 
implications of exceeding the delivery capabilities of a developed country has far deeper 
resource implications; especially for countries which are starting from a lower level.  
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This notwithstanding, denying sovereign States the right to make their own decisions would 
appear to compound the low status of countries that MSE hosting is perceived to address. For 
this reason, it seems sensible to suggest that a more appropriate response to the ethical 
dilemma of hosting rights is not to withhold them from states at lower levels of development, 
but rather to support them meet their goals and protect national interests. This would involve: 
1) improving understanding of the policy outcomes sought and why; 2) raising awareness of 
the problems that could arise in achieving these outcomes; 3) more effectively managing the 
demands that event owners and governing bodies place on hosts. The bigger question here is 
who should be responsible for this? 
Developing countries are on the periphery of the international community and are frequently 
subjugated. Mega-event hosting offers an opportunity to gain recognition from and access to 
the developed world, if only symbolically. Given that events have historically been hosted by 
developed countries, much of what is known reflects delivery in developed country contexts 
which, by association, reflects the world view of the specific developed country and its global 
position. Given the substantial difference a simple transfer of lessons learned and resultant 
expectations from the developed country experience is inappropriate in ways that parallel 
debates concerning ‘universal’ and ‘relative’ approaches to human rights and the standards 
and policies designed to achieve them (Bentley, 2005).  
Further, there is also the issue that despite laudable claims, the primary interest of the event 
owners is the delivery of an event. It remains the case that hosts – particularly those in the 
developing world - are potentially vulnerable to exploitation by the event owner. Ultimately 
though, any associated social and political impacts to the hosts remain the host’s 
responsibility. The point is not to suggest that this obviates the duty to protect citizens or that 
the capacity and priority for doing so should not be a fundamental piece of the award criteria.  
However, this is a qualitatively different consideration to the question of whether the capacity 
to make that decision should be denied to them based on an external evaluation of their 
capacity to meet externally determined judgments on social impact thresholds which appears, 
prima facie, to be denying an opportunity for sovereign decision making.      
It seems reasonable to suggest that, due to the imperatives of global sport and the need to 
attract new audiences and investors, there is a need to expand sporting events into hitherto 
uncharted territories. This will require a reconsideration of many of the hegemonic ideological 
assumptions around which international sports events are currently conceptualised (Author 
B). Palmer (2013) argues that a central feature of global sports events policy is the 
Westernisation of cultural mores and values in non-Western host cities. The 2010 men’s FIFA 
Football World Cup acts as a case in point. Author A argues that throughout South Africa’s 
journey to host the event, the imperative to satisfy FIFA’s various contractual demands 
regarding financing and infrastructure, amongst many others, created a situation in which 
national and local interests were highly vulnerable to those of the event. The subordination 
of national interests to accommodate mega-event prerogatives is significant because the 
rhetoric surrounding MSEs is that they will act as a catalyst for much needed social 
improvements. 
We acknowledge that the content of this paper is preliminary. Our intention was not 
necessarily to provide answers to our observations. Rather, our intention was to provoke 
15 
 
others to engage in work on this topic. At the very least, our aim was to shed light on some of 
the back stage, anticipatory concerns that surround hosting MSEs in developing or non-
Western contexts. In so doing, we hope these are now front stage and will be interrogated 
further. 
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1 Despite the established nature of these concerns, reports from the most recently held events in 
Brazil, the 2014 men’s Football World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games, suggest that an 
effective response to these concerns has yet to be established (cf. Marinho et al., 2014: 37-40). 
2 The Sport and Rights Alliance (SRA) is a coalition of leading NGOs, sports organizations and trade 
unions. It was founded in early 2015 to address the decision-makers of international sports mega-
events to introduce measures to ensure these events are always organized in a way that respects 
human rights (including labour rights), the environment and anti-corruption requirements at all 
stages of the process (for more information, visit: 
http://www.sportandhumanrights.org/wordpress/index.php/2015/07/06/sport-and-rights-alliance/. 
3 See http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2015/m=7/news=fifa-executive-committee-sets-
presidential-election-for-26-february-20-2666448.html for more information. 
4 Interviews with UK and international based sport reporters conducted by author A in 2010.  
5 Outside of political organisations like the United Nations, the membership of international sports 
organisation is one of the few ways in which the status of statehood may be recognised. 
6 In 2000 the FIFA Executive Committee voted for the men’s World Cup tournament to be rotated 
from continent to continent. As from 2018, the hosting of the event will cease to be rotated. 
                                                        
